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Abstract. Physical Access Control Systems are commonly used to se-
cure doors in buildings such as airports, hospitals, government buildings
and offices. These systems are designed primarily to provide an authen-
tication mechanism, but they also log each door access as a transaction
in a database. Unsupervised learning techniques can be used to detect
inconsistencies or anomalies in the mobility data, such as a cloned or
forged Access Badge, or unusual behaviour by staff members.
In this paper, we present an overview of our method of inferring directed
graphs to represent a physical building network and the flows of mobility
within it. We demonstrate how the graphs can be used for Visual Data
Exploration, and outline how to apply algorithms based on Information
Theory to the graph data in order to detect inconsistent or abnormal
behaviour.
Keywords: graph visualisation, graph mining, anomaly detection,
surveillance
1 Introduction
Physical Access Control Systems (ACS) are mandatory in secure facilities such
as airports and power stations, and ubiquitous in many other types of building,
such as hospitals, government departments and offices. ACS users present their
credentials (typically an Access Badge) to a door sensor. The system validates
the user’s identity and compares it to the Access Control Policy to decide whether
access should be granted or denied. The policy can restrict access to certain zones
or times. In a large installation, policy rules are complex and often contain errors.
The current generation of Access Control Systems can detect suspicious
events, such as the use of an Access Badge which has been reported stolen, or
an attempt to physically force a door. They cannot detect suspicious patterns—
transactions which are innocent in themselves but anomalous when considered
in context: an airport technician who regularly hangs around in the baggage
handling area, or a clerk who is spending an unusually long time on their own
in the cash room.
When an Access Badge is presented to a sensor, a transaction is generated and
stored in a database. Analysis of this data is typically limited to reports, alerts
or rules created by domain experts [6]. In our research, we will use unsupervised
learning techniques to detect inconsistencies—e.g. someone who appears to move
from one area to another in an infeasibly short amount of time—and anomalies
in mobility patterns. Inconsistencies may represent an intrusion using a cloned
Access Badge, while anomalies may indicate suspicious behaviour or rare events,
warranting further investigation in either case.
There has been relatively little published research in the area of physical Ac-
cess Control Systems, but there have been some attempts to apply lessons from
information access control. [6] proposes the use of Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) for building security and suggests dynamically changing the access pol-
icy to restrict where a “suspicious” user can go. The definition of “suspicious” is
left to a human expert. [7] compares an Expert System (user-defined rules) with
event classification (C4.5 decision trees) and outlier detection (LOF). However,
the dataset for this study is extremely small (only one sensor and five users).
ACS transactions are analysed to detect four kinds of suspicious patterns in
[2]. There is a separate algorithm for detecting each type of anomaly, using a
simple parameterised approach. Rather than have four separate algorithms, we
propose to use a single graph-theoretic algorithm which can detect both struc-
tural anomalies (unusual paths through the building) and numeric anomalies
(unusual timing data).
[1] uses Association Rule Mining (Apriori) to detect ACS policy misconfigu-
rations and predict required changes before the policy interferes with legitimate
accesses. We suggest that a graph-based approach using frequent subgraph min-
ing may be better able to process a dataset which is larger and more complex
than the one used in this study.
Graphs have been used for Visual Analytics in Internet Intrusion Detection
Systems [9], significantly improving on previous visualisation approaches, which
used simple statistical graphs. A similar Visual Analytic approach can be applied
to the real-time detection of abnormal behaviour in secure buildings.
We propose to develop our work by using our graph model to detect inconsis-
tent and abnormal behaviour. A number of algorithms for detecting structural
anomalies in graphs have been presented, including Subdue [10], Autopart [3]
and GBAD [4]. Characteristically, these algorithms work on unweighted graphs
with discrete vertex and edge labels, i.e., they cannot handle numeric attributes
in the graph. Recently [8, 11, 12], there have been some efforts towards frequent
subgraph detection on weighted graphs and graphs with numeric labels on ver-
tices and edges. These approaches do not specifically consider the problem of
anomaly detection, however. In [5], the GBAD-P algorithm is extended to han-
dle anomaly detection in numeric attributes, but assumes that the numeric values
follow a Gaussian distribution.
In the next section, we describe our use of graphs for visualising the physical
building network and the flows of mobility through it. We present our conclusions
to date in Sect. 3, including our proposal to apply graph-theoretic approaches
to anomaly detection in our future work.
2 Graph Visualisation of Transaction Data
While there is some previous work which analyses ACS data for physical security
applications, the novelty of our approach is to represent the topology of the
building and the mobility flows within it as a weighted, directed graph G =
(V,E). Each vertex v ∈ V represents a door sensor. Some doors have a sensor on
both sides, so each physical door is represented by one or two vertices. The graph
edges e ∈ E represent movements between sensors, with weight W(e) equal to
the number of movements along that edge. The positioning of the sensors and
the temporal ordering of the transactions imply a direction of travel for each
edge.
The graphs inferred from the ACS transactions are shown in Fig. 1. The size
of each vertex is proportional to its Degree, the number of transactions which
take place at that sensor. The colour of the vertex represents its Betweenness
Centrality (red is low, yellow is high). These measures allow us to quickly identify
main entrances and thoroughfares (0011–0010 and 0051–0050) and to distinguish
them from “dead-end” rooms which were later identified as Server Rooms (0020,
0150, 0210) and the Document Room (0040). The weight of each edge represents
the number of traversals of each pathway, i.e. it is proportional to the frequency
of each path segment in the dataset.
Visual Data Exploration can be seen as a hypothesis generation process [9].
It is particularly suitable when the data is noisy and difficult to understand, as
was the case in Fig. 1a. Through an iterative process of creating and visualising
network graphs, we discovered that the patterns during the first 10 weeks of the
dataset (Fig. 1b) were substantially different to those in the rest of the dataset
(Fig. 1c). We hypothesised that the early part of the dataset represented a test
of the system and identified the date that the system went live. We were later
able to confirm this hypothesis with the owner of the data.
Next, we investigated the effect of missing transactions caused by the com-
mon practice of “tailgating” (following another person through a door without
presenting a credential). The effect is to create edges in the graph which should
not be there. For example, if a user must pass sensors A and B in order to get
to C, but fails to swipe their Access Badge at B, a spurious edge will be created
from A→C. We wish to detect and remove such edges from the graph.
We note two characteristics of paths created by tailgating. First, tailgating
will always be represented as a shortcut, so there must exist a longer path con-
necting the end vertices. Second, we expect that valid paths will be followed more
often than invalid paths, so the weight of edges created by tailgating will be lower
than edges along valid paths. Our algorithm begins by considering each edge in
the graph in turn, starting with the lowest-weighted edges. For each edge tuple
(v1, v2), we search for all simple paths which satisfy {v1, . . . , v2 : (vi, vi+1) ∈ E}.
Once we have a set of candidate paths, we compare their weights. For the pur-
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Fig. 1: Directed Network Graphs: Vertices represent Access Control sen-
sors. Straight (directed) edges represent a movement from one vertex to an-
other. Curved edges represent mutual flows of mobility between two vertices.
The weight of each edge represents the number of traversals of each pathway.
poses of this comparison, we consider only the lowest weighted edge found along
each path. If the edge under consideration is of lower weight than any of the
other (longer) paths, the edge is considered spurious and is deleted from the
graph.
The result of applying this algorithm to Fig. 1c is shown in Fig. 1d. Our
algorithm has successfully removed all the spurious edges caused by tailgating,
and the pattern of valid movements through the building can now be clearly
seen.
3 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented an overview of our algorithms to infer a directed network
graph from an ACS database and to correct the graph for missing transactions
caused by tailgating. The graph represents an accurate topological map of the
building network and the valid flows of mobility which take place within it.
We demonstrated the use of graphs for Visual Data Exploration to clean
a dataset of mobility transactions prior to further analysis. A similar graph-
based approach can also be used for Visual Analytics, for real-time monitoring
of building security, to highlight possible security weaknesses and threats and
inform access policies.
The algorithm outlined in the previous section is a simple heuristic. Having
identified some of the important characteristics of the mobility graphs, we intend
to develop more formal methods for evaluating them. We propose that tailgating
behaviour could be detected by searching for frequent subgraphs and applying an
information theoretic algorithm to evaluate whether paths through the network
are normal or anomalous. We also intend to consider how probabilistic graph
approaches (cf. GBAD-P [4]) could be used to model the flow of the access
transactions and the uncertainties in the network.
In our future work, we will extend our model to encompass labelled graphs:
G = (V,E,LV , LE ,LV ,LE), where LV is a set of vertex labels, LE is a set of edge
labels, and LV and LE are label-to-value mapping functions. While V represents
the entities in the graph and E represents the relationships between entities, LV
and LE represent the attributes of the entities. We will allow that LV and LE
contain numeric (continuous) attributes and will present an algorithm which can
detect both structural and numeric anomalies in graph data.
The work presented in this paper inferred a flat, static graph. For visualising
and manipulating larger datsets, it will be necessary to extend our algorithms to
infer dynamic and hierarchical graphs. A hierarchical graph can cluster vertices
together based on considerations such as proximity or being along the same path.
Vertices can thus be expanded or collapsed for ease of viewing. We also propose
to infer dynamic graphs, so that mobility flows can be viewed as an animated
sequence. Dynamic graphs effectively provide a higher-dimensional view of the
data which will enable more complex anomaly detection algorithms.
Although we have focussed on security applications, there are other uses for
visualising mobility networks. We are involved in a health promotion project
where users touch sensors as they exercise in a local park. Graph Visualisation
can be used to identify the most popular pathways taken through the park and
identify changes in behaviour as a result of participation in the health promotion
scheme. These techniques could also be applied to the visualisation of mobility
data generated by GPS transceivers in the current generation of mobile phones.
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